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Prior research has focused on the performance implications of positive or neutral parent-child 
relationships, but neglected negative, conflict-laden relationships. This study explores from an 
embeddedness perspective whether parent hostility (degree to which an incumbent firm 
disapproves of the spawning of a spin-out from within its ranks) affects spin-out performance 
and how spin-outs can effectively react to it. Analyses of 144 technology spin-outs support 
our arguments that spin-outs suffer negative consequences from hostility. These are less 
severe, however, if the spin-out pursues effective network development. 
 
Keywords: spin-out, parent hostility, performance, entrepreneurship, technology 
 
JEL: L26, M13 
 
Acknowledgements: Helpful comments from Sarah Jack, MB Sarkar and two anonymous 
reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. We thank Tomi Laamanen for the editorial guidance. 
An earlier version of the manuscript (Walter, S. G., Heinrichs, S., & Walter, A. (2013). 
Spawned with a Rusty Spoon: When and How can Spin-outs Cope with Parent Hostility? 
Academy of Management Proceedings, 1-6) also considered environmental contingencies 
(market and technological turbulence) which we omitted here for space reasons. The findings 
indicate that spin-outs in turbulent markets are better able to cope with hostility. 
 
 
This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not 
been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which 
may lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this 
article as doi: 10.1002/smj.2201 
 












Spin-outs (entrepreneurial ventures by ex-employees) are legion in many high-tech industries 
and are well-known as strong innovators (Agarwal et al., 2004). A growing body of literature 
has highlighted that parent relations allow spin-outs to outperform other new entrants 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Andersson et al., 2012; Eriksson & Moritz Kuhn, 2006; Lindholm 
Dahlstrand, 1997; Wennberg et al., 2011). Indeed, many spin-outs are said to be ‘spawned 
with a silver spoon’ (Chatterji, 2009: 185) when close relationships to the parent firm provide 
them with benefits that other start-ups lack such as access to parent knowledge and networks 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Sapienza et al., 2004). However, many of these benefits depend on the 
parents’ benevolence and not all parents appreciate spin-outs. Often they perceive spin-outs as 
predators, stealing ideas and innovations (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). The name ‘dirty dozen’, 
given to the founders of the first IBM spin-out, is illustrative (McKendrick et al., 2009). 
Parent hostility—the degree to which an incumbent firm disapproves of the spawning of a 
spin-out from within its ranks—can also manifest in anti-spinout policies, such as lawsuits 
over intellectual property (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). Since relatively little is known about 
how parent hostility impacts spin-outs, we attempted to explore some fundamental questions 
for a theory-based understanding of parent-child firm relations: How does parent hostility 
influence spin-out performance? How can spin-outs respond effectively to hostility?  
Our study builds on existing work illuminating the performance impacts of parent-child 
relations. Prior studies have highlighted the importance of parental support in the 
development of different types of child firms in general, including divested units (e.g., 
Moschieri, 2011), spin-offs (e.g., Semadeni & Cannella, 2011), and spin-outs (e.g., Agarwal et 
al., 2004).1 However, a few gaps remain in areas crucial to our understanding of parent-child 
relationships. First, although conflict between a spin-out’s founders and the parent firm can be 
                                                 
1 The terminology related to start-ups is often confusing. Following Agarwal et al. (2004), we define spin-offs as 
ventures intentionally created by an incumbent firm, whereas spin-outs are created by ex-employees without 
intention one the part of the incumbent. These organizational forms differ in start-up rationales and equity 
involvement of the parent (Hellmann, 2007; Parhankangas & Arenius, 2003; Semadeni & Cannella, 2011).  











an antecedent of spin-out formation (Klepper & Thompson, 2010; Thompson & Chen, 2011) 
and although many scholars assume parents will react negatively to spin-outs (e.g., Klepper & 
Sleeper, 2005; Lindholm, 1994; McKendrick et al., 2009), prior research has focused on 
benevolent or neutral spin-off parents (Parhankangas & Arenius, 2003, Woo et al., 1992), 
while neglecting cases of parent hostility towards spin-outs. This is surprising, given that 
hostility can cause major problems for spin-outs, such as time- and money-consuming 
litigation (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). To be successful, founders must know when 
consequences of hostility are more severe and how to defend against it. Understanding 
hostility effects can also guide managers of the parent firm in their decision about whether to 
respond cooperatively or competitively to a spin-out. Second, while previous studies have 
adopted resource- or knowledge–based perspectives and focused on the parent-child dyad 
(e.g., Agarwal et al., 2004), they have not taken into account the wider network effects of this 
relationship. A parent’s influence on a spin-out’s performance may flow not only directly via 
the dyad (e.g., by providing only limited or no support), but also more indirectly via the 
network (e.g., by hindering the spin-out from establishing third-party ties). Neglecting the 
latter involves a risk of underestimating the parent’s role. 
Our study addresses the above gaps by examining whether parent hostility impairs spin-
out performance, in terms of time to breakeven, and what counter-strategies mitigate the 
potentially negative effect of parent hostility on spin-out performance. We adopt the 
perspective of embeddedness theory, with its basic premise that personal relationships 
develop alongside economic exchanges and that this social structure provides governance and 
access benefits in interfirm networks (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). Embeddedness theory 
provides a powerful framework for studying the performance consequences of dyadic 
relationships within a more complex social structure (Gulati et al., 2000; Uzzi & Gillespie, 
2002). In this context, we make two key points. One, ceteris paribus, parent hostility hinders 
child performance because it impedes transactions of the spin-out not only with the parent but 











also with the parents’ partners. Two, hostility effects are less severe under circumstances in 
which the parent is less willing or less able to act upon its hostility. These are cases in which a 
spin-out pursues a strategy to counter parent hostility, such as focusing on different products 
than the parent (product differentiation) or establishing ties to industry actors outside the 
parent’s immediate network (network development). Original survey data from 144 
technology spin-outs provides empirical support for most of our arguments. The technology 
setting is particularly well-suited to the purpose of our study because parent hostility often 
emerges in technology spin-out processes (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005) where the parent has no 
discretion over spin-out strategy (Agarwal et al., 2004). The study contributes to the literature 
on parent-child firm relations by substantiating the phenomenon of parent hostility and to the 
embeddedness literature by further exploring conflict-laden relationships. 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Embeddedness theory has become a prominent means of illuminating interfirm performance 
differentials (Gulati et al., 2000). It seeks to explain how social structure provides governance 
and access benefits in interfirm networks (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). According to the logic of 
embeddedness, economic exchanges become embedded in webs of social relations over time, 
thereby promoting feelings of reciprocity and trust among the individual actors involved in 
these exchanges (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). Since trust can substitute for costly 
contracts and active monitoring, embedded ties are typically viewed as economically efficient 
(Uzzi, 1996). As a consequence, embeddedness affects actor’s decisions about how and with 
whom to transact, which has important implications for start-ups that must acquire first 
customers and accumulate supportive resources from new or existing ties (Hite & Hesterly, 
2001; Starr & Macmillan, 1990). Uncertainty about a start-up’s quality and trustworthiness 
typically leads resource holders and potential customers not to transact with the start-up or to 
deploy costly safeguards against opportunistic action (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). Embedded 











ties convey access to reliable and inexpensive information on actors in a network, either via 
previous direct ties or shared third party ties, to overcome such uncertainty (Stuart, 1998). 
In line with embeddedness theory, prior research has highlighted how important pre-
existing strong ties are for start-ups entering industry networks and their social structures 
(Gulati, 1995; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Uzzi, 1996). A start-up’s 
connection to its parent firm can be such a tie (Semadeni & Cannella, 2011).2 From an 
embeddedness perspective, child firms can derive two key benefits from strong parent 
relations.3 First, the mechanisms of tie repetition (actors tend to form ties with the same actors 
repeatedly; Gulati, 1995; Podolny, 1994), and homophily (actors will associate or bond with 
others similar to them; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007) increase the likelihood and efficiency of 
parent-child transactions. Second, the mechanisms of tie transitivity and signaling increase the 
likelihood and efficiency of transactions with third parties. The tie transitivity argument 
predicts that actors tend to form ties with their partners’ partners because the direct partner 
can provide reliable information about the new or secondary partner (Gulati, 1995; Hallen & 
Eisenhardt, 2012; Podolny, 1994). The signaling argument purports that a child firm’s 
affiliations with its parent firm signal the legitimacy (Moschieri, 2011) and quality (Hallen, 
2008) of the former, especially in absence of another way to evaluate the reliability of a 
newcomer. These four mechanisms build the ground for our theorizing on impacts of parent 
hostility in the following section.  
 
Parent hostility and its performance consequences 
The literature has proposed that once a spin-out has been announced or registered, parent 
firms tend to respond in one of many ways, ranging from more friendly to more hostile. Some 
                                                 
2  It may also lie in the parent’s interest to sustain a relationship with its progeny because in order to manage or 
altogether avoid risks associated with child firms, such as lost access to critical resources or increased 
competition (Moschieri, 2011; Semadeni & Cannella, 2011). 
3  Some studies also point to substantial risks of overembedding with the parent (Clarysse et al., 2011; Sapienza 
et al., 2004; Semadeni & Cannella, 2011). 











parents react in a more friendly manner by encouraging and actively supporting spin-outs 
(Lindholm Dahlstrand, 1997). Other firms adopt a more neutral position, tolerating spin-outs 
that initially do not compromise the viability of their markets (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). But 
many firms tend to be wary of a spin-out or may even move against it (Garvin, 1983).4 In fact, 
the spin-out process can be prone to conflict, especially when tension between the former 
employee and employer is part of what has led to spin-out formation in the first place 
(Hellmann, 2007). Many spin-outs not only disrupt ongoing innovation processes and general 
social organization, but they also result in the parent losing critical firm-specific skills, 
routines, and other resources (Phillips, 2002; McKendrick et al., 2009). Concerns about 
resource misappropriation can lead parents to view spin-outs as ‘predators that steal their 
ideas and innovations’ (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005: 1305). Some firms—Intel is a very popular 
example (Jackson, 1998: 211-338)—respond to this perceived threat by systematically 
attempting to prevent or handicap spin-outs through non-compete covenants, intellectual 
property litigation, or rewards for revealing inventions (Campbell et al., 2012; Thompson & 
Chen, 2011). However, to date, the phenomenon of hostility has been relatively neglected in 
the extant literature. 
Some scholars have defined hostility in terms of actual behavior, for instance as ‘overt 
actions by one party toward another that the target perceives as malevolent, unfavorable, or 
even warlike toward himself or herself’ (Doucet, 2004: 761). We offer a definition of parent 
hostility in terms not of behavior but of attitude, as the degree to which an incumbent firm 
disapproves of the spawning of a spin-out from within its ranks. Our concept is akin to a 
cognitive one in psychology, where hostility means ‘negative beliefs about and attitudes 
toward others’ (Miller et al., 1996: 323). Conceptualizing hostility as an attitude rather than as 
a behavior has two distinct advantages. First, hostile behavior may take many forms, 
                                                 
4  Often, the spin-out situation involves the actors in ethical dilemmas. In many cases, it is obvious that 
incumbents are or become hostile because they believe there has been a breach of ethics on the part of an 
employee. However, such ethical issues are outside the boundaries of our study. 











including denial of direct support, law-suits, or moves to discredit the spin-out, (Klepper & 
Sleeper, 2005; McKendrick et al., 2009) that to date have not been well researched. Such 
behavior, however, presupposes a hostile attitude (Ajzen, 1991), and an attitude can be 
conceptualized more parsimoniously. Second, the attitude concept considers the possibility 
that parents might sanction unwanted progeny either with an unpredictable delay or not at all, 
while intentionally or unintentionally motivating their partners to also take hostile action. 
We now argue that parent hostility is negatively related to spin-out performance. We 
captured performance in terms of time to breakeven, defined as the number of full months 
between a firm’s founding and the first time its costs equaled its revenues. This measure is 
consistent with our theoretical framework which revolves around the notion that spin-outs can 
mitigate the negative consequences of hostility by deploying certain strategies that aid them in 
connecting with resource providers and customers despite that hostility. Linking to resource 
providers lowers the costs of resource acquisition (Starr & Macmillan, 1990) and linking to 
customers increases revenues. Both aspects are important, and both are incorporated in the 
breakeven measure. Moreover, the breakeven measure captures a firm’s progress toward 
profitability and thus toward survival, a critical goal not only for new firms. 
Embeddedness research proposes that spin-outs can benefit from privileged access to 
resource through prior dealings (tie repetition) or through similarity (homophily) with the 
parent firm (Gulati, 1995; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). Tie 
repetition and homophily lead to initial extensions of trust that can, if accepted and 
reciprocated, evolve into a self-reinforcing process of trust-building (Uzzi, 1996). Trust in 
turn makes parent-child transactions more likely to occur and more efficient when they do, 
which gives a spin-out distinct performance advantages (Agarwal et al., 2004; Eriksson & 
Moritz Kuhn, 2006; Wennberg et al., 2011; Phillips, 2002). However, as Uzzi and Gillespie 
(2002) note, embedded relationships do not automatically develop, and expectations or 
perceptions of opportunistic action by a spin-out are likely to prompt distrust. This can 











interfere with tie repetition and homophily mechanisms and, in turn, lead hostile parents to 
deny privileges to or otherwise handicap the spin-out (Lindholm, 1994:165), for instance by 
asserting its intellectual property rights (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). Transactions with hostile 
parents may therefore be more costly or impossible, impeding the spin-out’s timely and cost-
efficient resource acquisition. 
Hostility is also likely to hamper third-party transactions. Embeddedness theory 
suggests that, if there is conflict between two parties, a third party cannot collaborate with 
both without experiencing a ‘psychological strain’ (Heider, 1958; Granovetter, 1973). To 
resolve the tension, the third party will either discard one relationship or adjust its perception 
of the relationship between the parties to restore cognitive balance (Krackhardt, 1987). When 
choosing among potential partners who may be able to provide similar resources, 
organizations tend to select the partner with whom there is less uncertainty about whether this 
tie will produce the desired benefits (Podolny, 1994). Since spin-outs face, like all start-ups, 
the liabilities of newness and smallness, and are, thus, uncertain partners, a third party is 
likelier to prefer the parent firm. Consequently, in the presence of parent hostility, the tie 
transitivity mechanism is unlikely to unfold. Moreover, a hostile parent is likely to 
disseminate negative information about a spin-out which can overshadow any otherwise 
helpful signaling mechanisms. A spin-out can thus be cut off from the critical spillovers of 
reputation that, barring hostility, would lend it legitimacy and social status, and gain it access 
to financial and social capital within the industry (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Shane & Cable, 
2002; Stuart et al., 1999). With such resource disadvantages in the face of hostility, spin-outs 
of hostile parents should, ceteris paribus, perform worse than other spin-outs. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the parent hostility, the longer the spin-out’s time to 
breakeven. 
 












The first counter-strategy we consider is product differentiation, the degree to which the spin-
out focuses on other products than the parent. Generally, staying in the parent’s business is an 
attractive option, since the spin-out can leverage transferred knowledge and prior business 
contacts while drawing on a proven business concept. Many spin-outs not only locate in close 
proximity to the parent firm, but also inherit its product focus (Cooper, 1985). Klepper and 
Sleeper (2005), finding that 83% of the spin-outs in their sample initially produced the same 
lasers that their parents had produced, highlight the importance of non-overlapping product 
portfolios for positive parent-child relationships. We suggest two reasons why reducing 
overlaps between its and its parent’s product portfolio helps spin-outs mitigate the 
consequences of hostility. 
First, product differentiation reduces parent-child competition, so it lowers the parent’s 
interest in acting on a hostile inclination. A spin-out serving the market with different 
products is less likely to compromise the parent’s revenue streams. Even a hostile parent will 
be less likely to regard the progeny as a threat in such a case, and thus less likely to invest 
valuable resources and time in fighting it. The spin-out in this scenario may grow unharmed. 
This is consistent with Klepper and Sleeper's (2005) finding that so many of the spin-outs in 
their sample eventually differentiated their product strategy from that of their parents. 
Moreover, spin-outs can serve parents as customers or subcontractors (Lindholm Dahlstrand, 
1997), a relationship that might provide the spin-out with access to critical resources or 
promote early sales growth. A hostile parent is more likely to consider this option, when the 
benefits of those economic exchanges outweigh the cost and may take the firms’ relative 
competitive position into account. A spin-out that differentiates its product portfolio, thus, 
increases its chances of engaging in beneficial exchanges with the parent. 
Second, product differentiation constrains a parent’s ability to handicap unwelcome 
offspring. Undifferentiated spin-outs directly compete with more experienced, better 











established, and often larger parent organizations that generally possess the resources required 
to take retaliatory action (Thompson & Chen, 2011) such as initiating price wars or wooing 
away key customers. Sapienza et al. (2004), who illustrate the disadvantageous market 
position of entrants, demonstrate that high overlaps in production and technological 
knowledge between spin-outs and parent firms not only impede differentiation in the market, 
but also handicap a spin-outs’ sales growth. Retaliation measures, however, are costlier or 
even impossible in market segments a parent does not currently serve. To put it differently, 
even if a parent firm’s management was punitively hostile to a spin-out, the costs involved in 
moving against it in a different market segment might be prohibitively high. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 2. Product differentiation weakens the positive relationship between parent 
hostility and the spin-out’s time to breakeven. 
 
The literature has shown strategies for creating interfirm networks to be important for start-up 
performance (e.g., Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). This leads us to consider 
network development, the degree to which a spin-out establishes new ties outside the parent’s 
immediate network, as a second counter-strategy. At their founding, many spin-outs benefit 
from network ties that the founders carry over from their time at the parent firm (Agarwal et 
al., 2004; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Since parent and child firms often 
reside in the same geographic location (Woo et al., 1992), their networks tend to overlap 
initially (Agarwal et al., 2004; Higgins & Gulati, 2003). Although the literature regards it as a 
critical success factor, many new ventures do not focus on developing their networks (Hoang 
& Antoncic, 2003; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). However, we suggest that 
network development can dissipate the harmful consequences of hostility for several reasons. 
First, a spin-out pursuing network development links up with new partners, including 
suppliers, customers, and competitors, that are not directly connected to the parent and are 











thus less likely to be subject to its influences. In doing so, the spin-out reduces its parent’s 
ability to sanction or obstruct it, effectively emancipating itself from its influence. New 
partners—potential resource providers—now need not weigh the social costs of choosing 
between the child and the parent, so the spin-out will face lower barriers to mobilizing critical 
resources. Second, where a potential partner’s previous contact with the parent is limited, it is 
less likely to seek information on the spin-out from the parent or to weigh such information as 
highly as that coming from other market actors. Some spin-outs tend to cover their tracks, e.g. 
by keeping their origin secret, in order to avoid communication between potential partners 
and their parent firms (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). Third, in the face of hostile behavior by the 
parent, child firms can gain self-determination, flexibility, and discretion over their resource 
options by developing exclusive contacts and accessing information from new network ties 
(Moran, 2005). More and faster access to a broader spectrum of knowledge about valuable 
opportunities enhances firm performance (e.g., Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Finally, prior research 
into network inertia suggests that established (as opposed to new) organizations resist or have 
difficulties dissolving existing network ties and forming new ones (Kim et al., 2006). If a 
spin-out has developed its network independently, network inertia means that its parent is less 
likely to approach its new partners, which makes these a ‘safe haven’ for a spin-out entering 
an industry network. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 3. Network development weakens the positive relationship between parent 
hostility and the spin-out’s time to breakeven. 
 
METHODS 
Sample, procedure, and response validity 
We assembled a preliminary list of spin-outs from keyword searches of the internet and from 
lists of exhibitors at industry fairs. The search terms were broadly defined to include any new 











firm originating from an incumbent firm. Firms were sampled on three criteria: (1) At least 
one founder worked for the parent immediately before founding the spin-out; (2) the spin-
out’s business model is built on a technology transferred to it from the parent; and (3) the 
spin-out is headquartered in Germany. This resulted in a list of 1,168 likely technology spin-
outs. Of these, we selected 648 firms at random and called them to reconfirm that they met 
our sampling criteria, to schedule interviews, and to ask for referrals to other spin-out 
founders. Trained interviewers then conducted face-to-face interviews with spin-out founders 
who were willing to participate. This resulted in 144 cases with complete performance data.  
The spin-outs were on average 7.77 years old (sd = 3.11), had 24.25 full-time 
employees (sd = 85.67), and were active in the fields of software (34%), electronics (27%), 
nanotechnology and new materials (10%), biotechnology (8%), and others (21%). We 
sampled from multiple industries to increase the generalizability of our findings and to 
complement prior studies that had a mono-industry focus (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2004; 
Chatterji, 2009). Data on 105 parent firms was available. These firms averaged 43.47 years 
old (sd = 48.03) and 38,233 employees (sd = 92,501.57). The average geographical distance 
between parent and child firm was 138.49 km (median = 25.10, sd = 203.13). A comparison 
of responding and non-responding firms in terms of age and size (number of employees) 
indicated a low risk of non-response bias. Harman’s one-factor test, using a hostility measure 
constructed by independent coders, and a validation of breakeven data based on financial 
statements (n = 42, r = 0.88, p < 0.001) strengthened our belief that a common method bias 
was no serious threat. 
 
Measures 
Our dependent variable, time to breakeven, was measured as the number of full months 
between the firm’s founding (its date of incorporation) and the moment at which its costs 
equaled its revenues so that it started to make profits (as reported by the respondent). 











Confirming criterion validity, time to breakeven significantly correlated with our survey 
measures for goal achievement in terms of return on investment (r = - 0.41, p < 0.001), profits 
(r = - 0.35, p < 0.001), market share (r = - 0.33, p < 0.001), and sales (r = - 0.37, p < 0.001).  
For our independent variables, we measured parent hostility similar to Doucet (2004). 
Three coders reviewed case studies for each spin-out independently of one another and rated a 
parent firm either as 1 (for ‘hostile’) if the reports evidenced some form of disapproval, as 
reflected by words such as ‘litigation’, ‘lawsuit’, or ‘turmoil’, or as 0 (for ‘friendly or 
neutral’) otherwise. We provided the reviewers with our definition of parent hostility but, 
given the complexity of the phenomenon, not with an exhaustive list of keywords. The case 
studies were written by our interviewers and complemented the survey by adding information 
on the parent-child relationship as was available on the internet or from the respondent. The 
average agreement rate was 94%, with a Fleiss’ Kappa of 0.86 indicating high inter-rater 
reliability. Remaining discrepancies were resolved through discussion and reaching 
consensus. In addition, hostility was measured with three reverse-coded reflective items (α = 
0.96): ‘The management of the parent firm has appreciated the spin-out’, ‘In the phase of 
spinning-out, there has always been a benevolent posture’, and ‘The parent firm was open-
minded about the idea of creating a spin-out’. The items were, as always unless otherwise 
stated, measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = ‘does not apply at all’, 7 = ‘applies fully and 
completely’). Because this hostility measure was non-normally distributed, we dichotomized 
it using a median split (median = 3.5). Overall, both measures correlated highly (r = 0.92, p < 
0.001). To minimize the likelihood of common method bias, we drew on the coding-based 
measure in our main analyses and used the survey-based measure for robustness checks.  
To measure product differentiation, respondents rated the extent to which the parent and 
child firm offered similar products (7-point Likert-scale; 1 = ‘very similar’, 7 = ‘very 
dissimilar’) three years after founding. High values indicate that the spin-out pursued a 
product strategy different from the parent’s, whereas low values indicate that the two firms’ 











strategies were similar three years after founding. We opted for a lagged measure on the base 
of Klepper and Sleeper’s (2005) finding that spin-outs closely resemble their parents in 
product focus initially, but later start to differentiate in some cases. 
Our measure of network development is conceptually rooted in research suggesting that 
spin-outs often reside in close geographic proximity to their parents (Woo et al., 1992) and 
share the same set of network contacts prior to founding (Agarwal et al., 2004; Yli-Renko et 
al., 2001). Many new contacts established by the spin-out post-founding are, thus, not likely 
to be directly linked to the parent. Consequently, we asked respondents for the number of 
partners they had in the year of founding. Partners included key industry actors, namely 
suppliers, customers, and competitors (Sapienza et al., 2004). Respondents then specified how 
many of these contacts were newly established after their firm’s founding and how many of 
them resulted from referrals by the parent firm. We calculated the ratios of new, post-
founding contacts to total contacts respectively for suppliers, customers, and competitors. 
Parent referrals were disregarded since they could allow the parent to influence the spin-out 
indirectly. The three ratios were then summed up to create our composite measure of network 
development. High values reflect that a spin-out ‘renewed’ its network by acquiring new 
partners in the industry, which would be likely to reduce the overlaps in between a parent’s 
and a child’s respective networks. Low values show that the spin-out tended to rely on pre-
existing contacts or referrals from the parent firm, which would lead to significant overlap 
between the two firms’ networks. 
We considered several control variables. Product quality was measured with three items 
(α = 0.75) adapted from Atuahene-Gima & Ko (2001). Start-up experience was measured as 
the number of start-ups previously created by the spin-out’s founders. Initial product 
similarity captures the degree to which spin-out products resembled parent products in the 
founding year (7-point Likert-scale; 1 = ‘very dissimilar’, 7 = ‘very similar’). R&D intensity 
was measured as the average R&D expenditure per employee in the first three years. 











Exploration describes as a firm’s tendency to experiment with new alternatives rather than 
refine existing competencies and technologies. It was measured with four items (α = 0.76) 
adapted from Jansen et al. (2006). Confirmatory factor analysis indicates an adequate fit of 
our measurement models (χ2/df = 1.24; AGFI = 0.84; CFI = 0.97; IFI = 0.97; RMSEA = 
0.04), with a minimum average variance extracted of 0.46. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Table 2 reports the results of 
our negative binomial regression.5,6 Supporting Hypothesis 1, parent hostility and a spin-out’s 
time to breakeven were significantly and negatively related in all estimated models. About 
half of the surveyed ventures encountered some form of parent hostility in their first year 
(mean = 0.50, Table 1). Overall, hostility seems to protract the spin-outs’ time to profitability.  
 
 Hypothesis 2 received no support, since the interaction term of hostility and product 
differentiation was, on average, not statistically significant (average p > 0.10; cf. Footnote 7 
above). Hypothesis 3 was supported: Network development negatively moderated the 
relationship between hostility and time to breakeven (average p < 0.05); the interaction plot 
(available from the first author) was also in line with this finding. As a result, spin-outs that 
formed ties to new industry partners in the founding year can be said to have suffered less 
from hostility than other spin-outs. 
                                                 
5  Poisson regression and its generalized form, the negative binomial regression, are two ways of dealing with 
count data (Hausman et al., 1984). The first model assumes that the conditional mean of the outcome is equal 
to the conditional variance. According to a likelihood-ratio test for overdispersion, the conditional variance of 
our dependent variable was significantly greater than the conditional mean which runs contrary to the poisson 
regression’s assumption. We therefore used negative binomial regression assuming a gamma distribution for 
the conditional mean, so conditional mean and variance could vary.  
6  We employed hierarchical moderated regression analysis to test our models (Aiken & West, 1991). Moreover, 
Hoetker (2007) and Norton et al. (2004) emphasize that non-linear regression differs from ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression in its analyses of interactions. We therefore followed Hoetker’s (2007) suggestion of 
graphing the interactions using a procedure developed by Norton et al. (2004). The procedure also calculates 
average significance levels, from which we inferred the overall significance of our hypothesized interactions. 
Computations of the condition index (CI) and variance inflation factor (VIF) revealed no serious 
multicollinearity problems (CI < 3.92, VIF < 3.40). 











Conceivably, not only can parent hostility affect venture performance, but (anticipated) 
venture performance might drive parent hostility when spin-outs with high economic potential 
cause great financial loss to the parent firm and intensify competition in the market. This 
would make it a case of simultaneous causality, in which conventional estimation methods 
yield biased, inconsistent coefficients. Tests recommended by the extant literature 
(Wooldridge, 2003:121-122), however, indicated that parent hostility did not create an 
endogeneity problem. As a robustness check, we also considered additional control variables 
to capture resource flows between parent and spin-out (patent acquisition, parent support, 
parent-spin-out cooperation, sales to parent, and procurement via parent), spin-out 
characteristics (product development advantage, exploitation, and technological fields) and 
industry characteristics (industry competition and market growth). These variables proved 
statistically insignificant and their inclusion did not change the pattern of our original 
findings. We also reran our models using the survey-based measure for hostility. The results 
were virtually identical with our findings from the coding-based measure.   
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Research suggests that the origins of new firms may explain the heterogeneity of their initial 
resource endowments and, thus, performance. Specifically, spin-outs are said to owe superior 
access to critical resources and knowledge via the parent firm—a privilege that allows them to 
outperform de novo start-ups (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 2009; Klepper & Sleeper, 
2005; Wennberg et al., 2011). However, prior research seems to have neglected one important 
issue: Whether a parent firm grants or denies these benefits may crucially depend on its 
attitude toward the spin-out. Friendly parents are likely to support and cooperate with a spin-
out, whereas hostile parents might even combat and obstruct it. Our finding that parent 
hostility is a frequent problem and that spin-outs from hostile parents take longer to reach 
breakeven contributes to the literature on parent-child firm relationships. In linking hostility 











to spin-out development, our study may be among the first to theoretically and empirically 
substantiate the neglected phenomenon of parent hostility. While prior research has indicated 
that ‘inherited’ resource advantages enable spin-outs to outperform de novo start-ups (e.g., 
Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 2009), our theory suggests that these advantages are a 
function of parent hostility. In other words, while some spin-outs may ‘spawn with a silver 
spoon’ (Chatterji, 2009), benefitting from rightful knowledge transfers and parental support, 
other spin-outs may ‘spawn with a rusty spoon’, having to cope with parental sanctions.  
While the wider embeddedness literature has highlighted the value of embedded ties 
(Hallen, 2008; Shane & Cable, 2002) and explored the risks of being under- or over-
embedded (Gulati et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi, 1997), Granovetter (1973) has theorized that 
conflict-laden relations with one actor impede a party’s transactions not only with the 
immediately problematic actor but also with other actors in the network. Our study adds to 
this relatively neglected stream in the literature by demonstrating, theoretically and 
empirically, the negative performance consequences of such a handicapped starting position. 
Our findings suggest that, in the face of hostility, embedded ties are less valuable to a child 
firm if it has them in common with its parent. Relying on ‘inherited’ ties—often an obvious 
and tempting option for child firms—is then a suboptimal choice. The spin-outs in our study 
instead were able to alleviate the negative impact of hostility on their performance, when they 
quickly created ties to new partners including suppliers, customers, and competitors. 
Although network development incurs risk and costs, child firms faced with hostile parents 
derive greater benefit from it than from trying to leverage their network legacy. 
Our findings also bear on the debate over how parent firms might effectively respond to 
the spawning of own spin-outs. Some scholars have observed parents rigorously fighting them 
in hopes of avoiding another competitor (e.g., Jackson, 1998; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). 
Other scholars have highlighted the advantages to the parent of sustaining a cooperative 
relationship to maintain access to the progeny’s resources and technology (e.g., Moschieri, 











2011). Our findings add to this debate that the negative consequences of parent hostility are 
dissipated by the spin-out’s strategy that can limit the parent’s ability to sanction it. An 
understanding of these contingencies may guide managers of the parent firm in their decision 
about whether to respond cooperatively or competitively to a spin-out.  
Our study is not without limitations that are also exciting avenues for future research. 
First, we sampled from the population of technology spin-outs headquartered in Germany 
with parents from the same country. Our results are therefore conditional upon and mostly 
generalizable to this context. Second, our conceptual model builds on embeddedness theory to 
illuminate the theoretical mechanisms behind the proposed relationships. Given the purpose 
of our research, we did not draw on advanced methods of structural network analysis but 
instead used aggregated measures. Third, we limited our model to two theoretically important 
contingencies of the hostility-performance relationship. Future research could go further by 
exploring other factors such as a parent’s status in terms of power and reputation. Fourth, 
some established firms disapprove of spin-outs in general and have established anti-spin-out 
policies to minimize their occurrence. Such ‘institutionalized parent hostility’ can affect not 
only performance but also spin-out formation rates, another, exciting area for future research. 
Finally, our study takes no account of proactive efforts by a spin-out’s founders to pave its 
way by fostering the goodwill of the parent in advance. Such pre-founding championing 
behavior might secure parental support or, at least, reduce parent hostility by setting-up win-
win situations and allaying fears through mutual understanding. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlationsa 
 
 Variable Mean St.Dev. 1  2   3  4   5    6    7   8  
1.Time to breakeven (months) 18.54 21.24 -
2.Parent hostility 0.50 0.50 0.15t -
3.Parent hostility (alt. measure) 0.49 0.50 0.20* 0.92*** - 
4.Product differentiation 4.71 2.08 0.11 -0.04 0.00 - 
5.Network development 0.79 0.69 0.08 0.16t  0.13 0.00 - 
6.Product quality 5.52 1.20 -0.11 -0.01 -0.07 0.15t  0.03 -
7.Initial product similarity 3.92 2.38 -0.18* 0.06 0.03 -0.76*** -0.15t  -0.10 -
8.R&D intensity 15.20 18.14 0.17* -0.17*  -0.13 0.18*  -0.12 0.22**  -0.22** - 
9.Exploration 4.97 1.59 0.15t 0.02   -0.01  0.16t  0.10   0.32***  -0.15t 0.17*
N = 144. t < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed test). Pearson product moment correlations are 
reported for pairs of continuous variables, Spearman rank correlations are reported for pairs of continuous and 
dichotomous variables.  
 
 
Table 2. Regression results for time to breakevena 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
Control variables 
Product quality -0.201** 0.074 -0.202** 0.074 -0.247** 0.082 -0.200** 0.068 -0.239** 0.074
Start-up experience 0.222** 0.071 0.232** 0.073 0.229** 0.074 0.161* 0.072 0.158* 0.072
Initial product similarity -0.069t 0.038 -0.110t 0.064 -0.120t 0.063 -0.129* 0.059 -0.136* 0.058
R&D intensity 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.015* 0.006 0.014* 0.006
Exploration strategy 0.130* 0.063 0.137* 0.058 0.139* 0.060 0.122* 0.057 0.123* 0.059
Main effects 
Parent hostility 0.592** 0.185 0.588** 0.186 0.640*** 0.181 0.632*** 0.182
Product differentiation -0.064 0.067 0.009 0.077 -0.084 0.062 -0.012 0.075
Network development 0.069 0.128 0.073 0.130 -0.283t 0.153 -0.274t 0.157
Interaction effects 
Parent hostility X 
product differentiation 0.152t 0.084 0.148t 0.085
Parent hostility X 
network development -0.930*** 0.255 -0.910*** 0.262
Constant 2.830*** 0.093 3.084*** 0.124 3.076*** 0.125 3.117*** 0.123 3.107*** 0.124
df 137 134 133 133 132
Deviance  
(-2 log likelihood) 170.13 170.14 170.08 170.22 170.25
LR X2 14.66*    21.62**    23.65**    28.94***     30.95***   
N = 144; unstandardized coefficients. t < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed test). 
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